The recent tranche of terror laws passed Federal parliament with the support of both the government and the Labor party, and with almost no debate. It seems appropriate to dust off this address delivered over eight years ago...
Keynote Address to Australian Lawyers Alliance
Victorian State Conference
13 May 2006
British ships bombard Alexandria in 1883
At 7 am on 11 July 1882, the guns of the British Mediterranean fleet
opened fire on the Egyptian shore batteries at Alexandria. By five that
evening, most of the inhabitants of the town were streaming south towards
Cairo. The British landed a force of 20,000 men under the command of General
Sir Garnet Wolseley. The invading army fought a number of skirmishes, and the
Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and soon occupied Egypt, including, most importantly,
the Suez Canal.
The rhetoric preceding this conquest has an eerie familiarity. In
England the Egyptians were described as “terrorists” who broke all pledges and
murdered innocent European civilians. It was said to be imperative to land troops
to restore law and order. In Paris and London politicians began to speak of “a
dangerous pan-Islamic conspiracy, a resurgence of fanatical Mohammedanism”.
In Cairo, of course, it seemed the other way round – they described
themselves as surrounded and menaced by a Pan-Christian movement.
These were perilous times for Europe – the underprivileged seethed in
opposition to the powerful. The previous year, on 13 March 1881,
Tsar Alexander II had been assassinated by a Polish suicide bomber.
Britain also had its bombers – mostly anarchists at that time. In 1903
Joseph Conrad penned his novel The Secret
Agent about anarchists in London planning to blow up the Greenwich
observatory.
And yet we have this rhetoric that the world changed on 11 September. What
on earth does this mean? Of course the world changed on that day, as it does on
every day. But there has been no fundamental shift. 11 September saw the perpetration of a shocking crime, but it did not threaten our democracy or our traditions.
Prime Minister Howard commenting
on counter-terrorism laws passed in 2005 acknowledged that while the laws were
unusual, they were ‘necessary because we live in unusual times’ [1].
The logic seems to be that the ‘extraordinary’ threat of terrorism requires
extraordinary measures.
But the Federal Government’s
National Counter-Terrorism Alert Level remains, as it has done since before 11
September 2001, on its second lowest level – medium, which indicates “a
terrorist attack could occur”. [It moved up a notch in 2014 – but for reasons
which were never clearly explained.]
On 27 February 1933, the
immense Reichstag (parliament) building, the focal point of Berlin’s imperial district, was
set on fire and destroyed. Only the shell remained. It was a shocking act of
terrorism.
In the midst of the public
alarm that followed, Adolf Hitler, who had been Chancellor for less than a
month, and whose coalition ministry contained only two other Nazis, went to
President Hindenburg and presented him with an emergency decree, drafted by
non-Nazi public servants, “for the protection of the people and the state”.
The decree abrogated basic
civil rights. Hitler said that with this decree he could “try enemies of the
state legally and deal with them in a way that will put an end to
conspiracies.”
The Reichstag fire was also
used to justify the passing of the Enabling Act which further consolidated the
control of the executive over elected representatives.
These two pieces of
legislation were the legal foundation for all the excesses that followed.
Here in Australia, following
the 11 September attacks, both Labor and the coalition combined to pass
so-called “anti-terror” laws. Not only do these laws deliver extensive new
powers to security services, they remove any practical means of public scrutiny
of those bodies. No other country in the world has gone as far as Australia in
passing such laws.
The rule of law requires that
government authority be exercised through precise written laws which avoid
arbitrary application - or the rule of whim. The rule of law is intended to
operate as a bulwark against tyranny. The rule of law is not served where laws
are so broadly expressed that their implementation depends on the particular
prejudices and agendas of those empowered to administer them. So it is often
said that our so-called “Westminster system” is designed to be a rule of laws,
and not of men.
The rule of law embodies many
specific principles, including habeas corpus – the principle that a person
denied liberty is entitled to know the charge upon which they have been
arrested, and to have the lawfulness of their custody reviewed by judicial
authority.
The terrorism laws passed by
both Federal and State governments since 11 September 2001 are contrary to the
concept of the rule of law.
These laws rest on three key
planks. First, these laws brought into existence a range of ‘terrorism’
offences.
At the base of these offences is the wide statutory definition of a ‘terrorist
act’; a concept that, at its margins, embraces certain acts of industrial
action like picketing by nurses.
These offences travel far beyond acts like bombing and hijackings (already
serious criminal offences) not only to criminalise ‘terrorist acts’ but also conduct ancillary to ‘terrorist acts’. Australia’s terror
laws now define as terrorism many things that most people would not understand
as terrorist crimes.
1.
Recklessly helping an organisation indirectly engage
in fostering the doing of a terrorist act is now a crime. (publication of views
that are favourable to a particular organization may well be enough)’
2.
Possession of a thing associated with terrorism is a
crime – an incredibly vague provision.
3.
Reckless collection of documents likely to facilitate
terrorist acts is a crime – how would one know if one was breaching this law?
4.
Deliberate assaults by politically motivated
protesters in another country are now a terrorist crime under Australian terror
laws.
5.
Violent resistance to any foreign government,
regardless of the oppressive nature of the regime, is now a crime in Australia.
Under our present laws, the Kurds fighting Saddam Hussein would be guilty of
terrorism, and so would anyone raising money to help them. The same may be said
of Fretilin in East Timor. If resistance to Mugabe becomes violent in Zimbabwe,
our law will treat those opposing his regime as terrorists. Perhaps it is
unlikely such people would be prosecuted, but it is contrary to the rule of law
for enforcement of criminal offences to be dependent on the foreign policy of
the government of the day.
6.
Under our laws, a striking worker who assaults a scab
while manning a picket line against a certain government policy would be guilty
of terrorism.
7.
A person who is believed to have information relating
to terrorism may be detained by ASIO for questioning for 7 days, and a further
warrant may be obtained for further questioning if new information comes to
light - indefinitely. Only Australia has authorized detention of non-suspects
in this way.
Second, powers have been
conferred on the Government to ban ‘terrorist’ organisations. Part 4 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth)
requires the Foreign Minister to list a person or entity if satisfied, among
others, that such a person or entity is involved in a ‘terrorist act’; a term
that is not defined by the Act.
If an entity or person is listed, it is illegal to use or deal with the assets
of the listed person or entity. It will also be an offence to directly or
indirectly provide assets to a listed person or entity.
Under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal
Code’), regulations can be passed listing an organisation as a ‘terrorist
organisation’ if the federal Attorney-General is satisfied, on reasonable
grounds, that the organisation is ‘directly or indirectly engaged in,
preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act
(whether or not the terrorist act has occurred or will occur)’.
Last year, the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2)
2005 (Cth)
expanded this banning power to include organisations that ‘advocate’ the doing
of a ‘terrorist act’. ‘Advocate’ was defined broadly to include in/directly
counselling or urging the doing of a ‘terrorist act’ as well as directly
praising such acts where there is a risk that such praise might lead another to
engage in such acts.
This proscription regime
captures organisations that many would not consider ‘terrorist’ organisations.
The definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ is not restricted to organisations
whose principal activities are the promotion and engagement of extreme acts of
ideological/religious violence. A ‘terrorist’ organisation can, for example, be
an organisation which is predominantly involved in charitable work but is also
indirectly involved in a ‘terrorist’ act.
Once listed, a particularly
far-reaching set of ‘terrorism’ offences will apply to the organisation. The
‘terrorist organisation’ offences under Criminal
Code basically impose criminal liability upon the entire group and persons
who engage in certain forms of association with the proscribed group.
Membership of such organisations, for instance, is punishable by a maximum of
ten years in prison.
Take another example: an aid worker providing ‘first aid’ training to a
predominantly charitable organisation s/he knows has, on a few past occasions,
engaged in an extreme act of ideological/political violence would clearly be
committing the offence of providing training to a ‘terrorist organisation’. It
is no defence to this crime that the training was not related to a ‘terrorist
act’. The crime is committed so long as training, whatever its content, is
received or provided to a ‘terrorist’ organisation.
Hence, an aid worker providing humanitarian training to movements such as
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, groups believed
to have resorted to acts of ideological/political violence, in the wake of the
tsunami disaster would be culpable under this offence despite having no direct
involvement with such violence. Given that there is knowledge that the
organisation is a ‘terrorist’ organisation, the aid worker in both scenarios
presently faces the prospect of 25 years in jail.
The third plank of Australia’s
anti-terrorism laws are unprecedented powers conferred upon security and police
organisations. Since mid-2003, the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (‘ASIO’) has had powers to compulsorily question and detain
persons suspected of having information related
to a ‘terrorism’ offence. Such persons can be detained for up to a week in
largely incommunicado circumstances.
With the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth),
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) acquired a new set of powers. A senior AFP
officer (without the necessity of judicial warrant) can now issue a
preventative detention order authorising the imprisonment of a person for up to
24 hours when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the person is engaged in
various ‘terrorism’ offences and the order will substantially assist in
preventing a ‘terrorist act’ and is reasonably necessary for this purpose. Such
detention may be extended for another 24 hours by a current or retired judicial
officer.
Further, upon a request by a
senior AFP officer, a control order may be issued by a court against persons not suspected of any crime. If satisfied
on the balance of probabilities that the order will substantially assist in
preventing a ‘terrorist act’ or the person has provided or received training
from a listed ‘terrorist organisation’, the court may issue such an order if it
is reasonably necessary to protect the public from a ‘terrorist act’. These
orders can last up to a year and result in house arrest.
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) also enacted a
‘notice-to-produce’ regime. This regime included provisions allowing the AFP to
issue a notice requiring the production of documents including those disclosing
financial, telephone, travel and residential details if a senior AFP officer
was satisfied that such documents were relevant and would assist the
investigation of ‘terrorism’ offences. Once subject to such a notice, a person
must produce the documents with failure to do so punishable by a fine.
The Victorian terror laws
quietly passed parliament during the Commonwealth Games. This was despite a
damning critique from the Privacy Commissioner, and many concerns expressed by
the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee. Victoria’s 2002 legislation was
due to sunset in 2006, and there was to be an inquiry that year to consider
whether to extend them. The 2006 legislation removed the requirement for an
inquiry and removed the sunset provisions. The new laws were more draconian
that any other terror laws, permitting, for example, the detention without
charge of citizens for 14 days, without court supervision. Once again the
hysteria in relation to terrorism was used to sweep away long established human
rights which are fundamental to our democratic system of government and the
rule of law.
Under Australian
anti-terrorism laws broad criminal offences are accompanied by executive power
to trigger such offences. Also hinging upon these offences are coercive powers
to investigate and prevent these offences. Together these planks evidence a
shift from preventing terrorism in conformity with the rule of law to a model based
on pre-emption.
Counter-terrorist measures
were not brought into existence by these laws. Prior to the enactment of these
laws, however, ‘a counter-terrorism structure (was) developed within the existing criminal justice
system which treats terrorism as essentially a peace-time, criminal, matter’.
Being indigenous to the existing criminal justice system, the previous set of
counter-terrorism measures was informed by what could be dubbed a rule of law model.
Various elements constitute this model. First, terrorism was to be punished by
traditional criminal offences. For instance, Sir Victor Windeyer who advised
the Protective Security Review emphatically
rejected the enactment of ‘terrorism’ offences and said:
all forms of violent wrongdoing that
are called terrorism are punishable as crimes under Commonwealth or State laws.
The best safeguard against new terrors and apprehensions may lie in the
rigorous enforcement of existing criminal law rather than in making new laws
expressly about ‘terrorism’.
Second, these criminal
offences were set out in statute and typically only made illegal intentional
conduct causing serious physical harm or property damage. Third, an accused was presumed innocent with the onus on the
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Fourth, detention being
‘penal or punitive in character’ was seen to ‘exists only as incident of the
exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt’.
Arrest of those charged with crimes was a qualification to this notion but a
heavily qualified one: those arrested were to be promptly brought before a
court. Fifth, prevention of criminal activity (and not only its prosecution
after the fact) was clearly a legitimate aim of policing and to that end,
police were not only granted arrest powers but also investigative powers of search,
questioning and interception. These powers could only be exercised with some
proof of criminal activity and were typically supervised by independent
authorities.
With the enactment of the post-September 11 terrorism laws, the aim of
prevention has become dominant. The model then becomes of one of pre-emption. This model is pre-emptive
in the sense that prevention of the risk of
terrorism comes to the fore. And in preventing this risk, it is legitimate
under this model to launch anticipatory strikes. The model is also pre-emptive
in a different sense: prevention takes priority over other considerations
whether it be the rights of the accused or the need for proper proof.
Criminal laws and police
powers then become less about criminal
justice, that is, bringing the accused to trial for the purpose of
conviction and punishment, but rather about reducing the chance of terrorism.
Not surprisingly, key elements of the rule of law model are displaced. Under
the pre-emption model, not only are there ‘terrorism’ offences but some of
these offences can be triggered by executive decisions. The powers to ban
‘terrorist’ groups do precisely this. The ambit of these offences also goes far
beyond intentional conduct causing serious physical harm or property damage. Indeed,
in many instances, in particular the offences relating to ‘terrorist
organisations’, there is no need to demonstrate a nexus between the conduct of
the accused and violence or damage. For example, breaching ‘(a)n important
premise behind the rule of law . . . that governments should punish criminal
conduct, not criminal types’,
the ‘terrorism’ offences provides for status
crimes, most notably, by making mere membership of a ‘terrorist
organisation’ an offence.
Significant inroads have
been also made into the presumption of innocence. Many ‘terrorism’ offences
provide for strict liability elements which place the onus on the defendant to
disprove a circumstance.
More strikingly perhaps there is now a presumption against granting bail to those charged with ‘terrorism’ offences.
This presumption operates by way of statutory fiat and draws no distinction
between ‘terrorism’ offences involving serious violence and those that do not.
For instance, ten Melbourne men were charged with terrorism offences late last
year with none of the charges alleging any violent acts or attempts to commit
violent acts. Yet all have been refused bail because of their failure to
demonstrate ‘exceptional circumstances’
and, as a result, are now in solitary confinement in Barwon Prison’s
maximum-security Acacia unit.
Further, detention is no
longer seen as largely the function of criminal punishment. ASIO’s compulsory
questioning and detention powers are ostensibly aimed at
intelligence-gathering. Control orders (which may in the extreme result in
house-arrests) and preventative detention orders may be issued without the need
for any criminal charges, let alone proof of criminal guilt.
Broad investigative powers
have also been conferred in the name of fighting ‘terror’. No longer are
investigative powers restricted to situations where there is some proof of
criminal conduct. ASIO’s questioning and detention powers can be exercised
against persons suspected of having information relating to a ‘terrorism’
offence. A control order can be issued against a person so long as the relevant
authorities are satisfied that the order will substantially assist in
preventing a ‘terrorist act’ regardless of whether person subject to the order
is suspected of a crime. These powers, at least, are subject to some
independent oversight. This, however, is not the case with initial preventative
detention powers and key aspects of the 'notice-to-produce’ regime.
By
departing from many established principles of criminal law, the model of
pre-emption underlying the ‘terrorism’ laws then must necessarily be seen as
exceptional. Are they justified?
As Lord Hoffmann said when
the House of Lords found that legislation permitting the administrative
detention of foreign terrorist suspects violated human rights:
Terrorist
crime, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil
community.
The
real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from
terrorism but from laws such as these.
That
is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for parliament to
decide whether to give the terrorists such
a victory.
